Under today’s legislation, every single one of those people writing in support of the African National Congress or out campaigning for the release of Nelson Mandela would have been liable for arrest under Section 12(1)(a) of the Terrorism Act.In the same vein, Jonathan Cook has written, in Starmer's purges of Labour have mutated into the arrest of Palestine supporters
UPDATE (Jan 2025): In another more recent article Craig discusses the hypocrisy of the UK government in relation to its support of HTS (the new Syrian government):The need for careful distinctions should be obvious. Would praising Hamas leaders, even its military leaders, for agreeing to sit down in peace talks amount to “support” for a terror organisation? Should it lead to arrest and jail time?
It was never a crime to “support” Sinn Fein – the political wing of the IRA – in the sense of having complimentary things to say about its long-time leader, Gerry Adams, or backing its political positions.
It wasn’t even illegal to “support” actual IRA “terrorists”. Back in the early 1980s, many people criticised the Ulster authorities and the British government of Margaret Thatcher for their barbaric treatment of IRA prisoners.
Until the government, through an Order in Council, actually removes the proscription of HTS as a terrorist organisation, it is still illegal to support it in the UK – and it is illegal for government ministers to support it, let alone ex-functionaries like John Sawers, Alastair Campbell and Rory Stewart.
Now in practice, there is nothing to prevent the massive hypocrisy of the Terrorism Police harassing, and the CPS prosecuting, people for very tangential “support” of Hamas and Hezbollah, while much more blatant and open support of HTS goes unpunished.
UPDATE (Feb 2025): In another more recent article Craig tells us United Nations Censures UK Over Abuse of Terrorism Act Against Journalists and Activists: as he says, "the second part [of the letter from the UN] is a devastating critique of the UK’s terrorism laws".
There is also an article on Skwawkbox about this which concludes
The letter – unsurprisingly, as a formal and legally-constructed United Nations communication – accuse the Starmer regime of the deliberate abuse of shoddy legislation to harass, intimidate, threaten and criminalise free speech on Palestine to protect Israel, because of Starmer’s absolute commitment to Zionism and the ‘right’ of Israel to slaughter and act as it wishes.
Now let me bore you with the detail.
Firstly, note that there are two of them, 2000 and 2006. Section 1 of the 2000 Act gives the definition of terrorism which is used in both Acts (see s20(1) of the 2006 Act)
Terrorism: interpretation.
(1) In this Act, "terrorism" means the use or threat of action where:
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it:(a) the action falls within subsection (2);
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public; and
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.
(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied. (4) In this section:(a) involves serious violence against a person;
(b) involves serious damage to property;
(c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action;
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public; or
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.
(5) In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation.(a) "action" includes action outside the United Kingdom; and
(b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated,
(c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other than the United Kingdom, and
(d) "the government" means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom.
And that's it. Nothing about who is doing it, whether the military of the UK or another country or the military forces of a de-facto government or anyone else. Nothing about whether things are being done in a "just cause", however you might assess that.
In short, it covers equally what might be more usually described as "war-fighting" than as "terrorism", and whether or not the war-fighting is legal or "just" or involves war crimes or not.
Less surprisingly, nothing about whether the activities in question are or were commanded by God (as, eg, in Deuteronomy 7:1-6 or Deuteronomy 13:6-15).
So what are the offences related to terrorism?
Section 1 of the 2006 Act: Encouragement of terrorism
(1) This section applies to a statement that is likely to be understood by a reasonable person as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published, to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences.
(2) A person commits an offence if-
(3) For the purposes of this section, the statements that are likely to be understood by a reasonable person as indirectly encouraging the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences include every statement which-(a) he publishes a statement to which this section applies or causes another to publish such a statement; and
(b) at the time he publishes it or causes it to be published, he-
(i) intends members of the public to be directly or indirectly encouraged or otherwise induced by the statement to commit, prepare or instigate acts of terrorism or Convention offences; or
(ii) is reckless as to whether members of the public will be directly or indirectly encouraged or otherwise induced by the statement to commit, prepare or instigate such acts or offences.
(4) For the purposes of this section the questions how a statement is likely to be understood and what members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer from it must be determined having regard both-(a) glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally) of such acts or offences; and
(b) is a statement from which members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer that what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be emulated by them in existing circumstances.
(5) It is irrelevant for the purposes of subsections (1) to (3)-(a) to the contents of the statement as a whole; and
(b) to the circumstances and manner of its publication.
(a) whether anything mentioned in those subsections relates to the commission, preparation or instigation of one or more particular acts of terrorism or Convention offences, of acts of terrorism or Convention offences of a particular description or of acts of terrorism or Convention offences generally; and,
(b) whether any person is in fact encouraged or induced by the statement to commit, prepare or instigate any such act or offence.
So these provisions apparently apply, for example, to the following examples:
Per Section 3 and following, the Secretary of State may proscribe an organisation if he believes that it is concerned in terrorism, which, as described above, is a very low bar. There is apparently no obligation upon him to proscribe such an organisation, so he can limit proscribed organisations to ones he doesn't like.
But once an organisation is proscribed, then it is an offence to "support" it.
Section 12 of the 2000 Act: Support
(1) A person commits an offence if-
(1A) A person commits an offence if the person-(a) he invites support for a proscribed organisation, and
(b) the support is not, or is not restricted to, the provision of money or other property (within the meaning of section 15).
(2) A person commits an offence if he arranges, manages or assists in arranging or managing a meeting which he knows is-(a) expresses an opinion or belief that is supportive of a proscribed organisation, and
(b) in doing so is reckless as to whether a person to whom the expression is directed will be encouraged to support a proscribed organisation.
(3) A person commits an offence if he addresses a meeting and the purpose of his address is to encourage support for a proscribed organisation or to further its activities.(a) to support a proscribed organisation,
(b) to further the activities of a proscribed organisation, or
(c) to be addressed by a person who belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organisation.
The word "support" is, conveniently, not defined. Does it mean something like "assist in the affairs of", or merely something like "express approval of", or even just "approve of"?
In the case Choudary & Anor v R. [2016] EWCA Crim 61 the Court said at para 35
[the section] does not prohibit the holding of opinions or beliefs supportive of a proscribed organisation; or the expression of those opinions or beliefsBut that was before s12(1A) was inserted (apparently as a result of this case). And "support", as in s12(1A)(b) now, is still not clearly defined.
So, where a proscribed organisation is a government (or some sort of pseudo-government), is it an offence to
By Schedule 7 of the 2000 Act, sub-paragraph 2(1), a person arriving in the UK may be questioned
... for the purpose of determining whether he appears to be a person falling within section 40(1)(b)that is, a person who
is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism(as defined in Section 1).
Since it says "being concerned in the commission [etc] of acts of terrorism" rather than, for example, encouraging or inducing the commission [etc] of such acts (as in Section 1 of the 2006 Act), one might think it means some actual involvement. If so it is hard to imagine what grounds the authorities might have had for applying Schedule 7 to Ernest Moret or Craig Murray. But then, it is stated specifically, in sub-paragraph 2(4), that
An examining officer may exercise his powers under this paragraph whether or not he has grounds for suspecting that a person falls within section 40(1)(b)So there it is, this encourages them to do this to anyone they choose. In fact, according to David Miller, people of Pakistani ethnicity are over 150 times more likely to be detained under Schedule 7 than white people.
On the other hand the questioning must be for the purpose of determining whether he appears to be a person who ... I'd certainly like to see the results of a case where the police were required to show that that was in fact their purpose.
Then of course there is training. Section 6 of the 2006 Act covers training "in connection with ... acts of terrorism" (though there need not be specific acts in view), and we have discussed how broadly "terrorism" is defined.
Somewhat overlapping this is Section 54 of the 2000 Act
54 Weapons training.
(1) A person commits an offence if he provides instruction or training in the making or use of-This seems to cover, fair and square, my own involvement in the school cadets at my secondary school. In my defence, I was never a particularly enthusiastic cadet - most of the kids in my class were promoted to corporal for our second year, but not I. Though admittedly, this was more because of my lack of interest in polishing boots and belt buckles, rather than because of a distaste for racing around the bush firing rifles (loaded with blanks) at pretend Vietnamese peasants.(a) firearms(2) A person commits an offence if he receives instruction or training in the making or use of-(a) firearms
There is a defence - if the person charged can prove that his involvement was nothing to do with terrorism (as defined, broadly, discussed above - difficult to prove, I imagine, when the training is intended to introduce one to the possibility of a career which would include firing rifles at Vietnamese peasants).
And both these sections about training offences apply to training outside the UK (Section 17 of the 2006 Act) and the terrorism envisaged in the training may also be outside the UK (s1(4) of the 2000 Act, quoted above). Thus the fact that my own "terrorist training" took place in Australia is beside the point. This, then, makes me a "terrorist" (Section 40 of the 2000 Act) and so subject to arrest without a warrant (Section 41(1) of the 2000 Act).
Section 58 of the 2000 Act makes it an offence to record, possess or view over the internet "information of a kind likely to be useful to [a terrorist]" (s58(1)). Which obviously includes road maps, train or bus timetables, and so forth.
In the case of this provision the House of Lords has said, in R v G, R v J [2009] UKHL 13
42. Parliament cannot have intended to criminalise the possession of information of a kind which is useful to people for all sorts of everyday purposes and which many members of the public regularly obtain or use, simply because that information could also be useful to someone who was preparing an act of terrorism.It's nice that in this case the court has decided that what the Act says is too stupid to be taken seriously. But one can never rely on the courts taking this approach.
There is a defence of "reasonable excuse" (s58(3)), of which examples are given (s58(3A)). Bizarrely, one of the examples of reasonable excuse is one of the possible scenarios where there is an absence of mens rea, see paras 47, 50 and 60 of R v G, R v J. But a notable omission from the examples of reasonable excuse is the very likely candidate, having a reason for the possession (etc) that is nothing to do with terrorism. In fact the House of Lords, in R v G, R v J, overruling an earlier case, decided that this would not necessarily be a reasonable excuse (paras 71 to 73 and following).
There seems to be quite a smorgasbord of legislation which the authorities can use against people they don't like. In the case of Kit Klarenberg it was the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 Mostly, it seems, this Act amends the Terrorism Acts 2000 and 2006, but its Schedule 3 seems to provide new powers. Schedule 3 seems to be mostly very similar to Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 but for a different purpose.
By Schedule 3, sub-paragraph 1(1), a person arriving in the UK may be questioned
... for the purpose of determining whether the person appears to be a person who is, or has been, engaged in hostile activity ...The definition of "hostile activity" seems arguably sensible, but as with Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000, we have in, sub-paragraph 1(4)
An examining officer may exercise his powers under this paragraph whether or not he has grounds for suspecting that a person is or has been engaged in hostile activity.But, again, the questioning must be for this purpose.
Thanks to Aya / Challenge the Narrative for mentioning this case. The case R v Gul [2013] UKSC 64, in the Supreme Court, was primarily about the meaning of "terrorism" in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000.
It says a lot about the breadth of the definition of terrorism, notably in paragraphs 28,29,33,34,61. In particular: (the following expressed rather tentatively in para 28)
... the definition of terrorism in section 1 in the 2000 Act is, at least if read in its natural sense, very far reaching indeed. Thus, on occasions, activities which might command a measure of public understanding, if not support, may fall within it: for example, activities by the victims of oppression abroad, which might command a measure of public understanding, and even support in this country, may well fall within it.The following are about or quoted from an Independent Reviewer of the legislation.
actions may amount to terrorism within the definition "even when they might otherwise constitute lawful hostilities under international humanitarian law (e.g. acts of violent rebellion against oppressive governments)" (para 33)and the definition was referred to as
"remarkably broad – absurdly so in some cases" (para 34)
"the current law allows members of any nationalist or separatist group to be turned into terrorists by virtue of their participation in a lawful armed conflict, however great the provocation and however odious the regime which they have attacked" (para 61)The judgment makes the point that the consent of the DPP is required for a prosecution, this being seen as "ensuring that a prosecution should not be instigated nor proceed if this would not be in the public interest" (para 36). However, importantly, the Court pointed out
The Crown's reliance on prosecutorial discretion is intrinsically unattractive, as it amounts to saying that the legislature, whose primary duty is to make the law, and to do so in public, has in effect delegated to an appointee of the executive, albeit a respected and independent lawyer, the decision whether an activity should be treated as criminal for the purposes of prosecution. ... [This] risks undermining the rule of law. It involves Parliament abdicating a significant part of its legislative function to an unelected DPP, or to the Attorney General, who, though he is accountable to Parliament, does not make open, democratically accountable decisions in the same way as Parliament. Further, such a device leaves citizens unclear as to whether or not their actions or projected actions are liable to be treated by the prosecution authorities as effectively innocent or criminal ...Furthermore the protection afforded by the DPP's "prosecutorial discretion" applies only to the bringing of charges to court. Regarding "police officers deciding whom to arrest or to stop at a port" (para 34), or the Home Secretary deciding which organisations to proscribe, it provides no such protection. The judgment discusses this in paras 33,34,37,63,64. Thus the Independent Reviewer referred to
the risk that "strong powers could be used for purposes other than the suppression of terrorism as it is generally understood" (para 33)and that even where the activity does not warrant prosecution
First, the lawfulness of executive acts such as detention, search, interrogation and arrest could be questioned only very rarely indeed in relation to any actual or suspected involvement in actual or projected acts involving "terrorism", in circumstances where there would be no conceivable prospect of such involvement being prosecuted. Secondly, the fact that an actual or projected activity technically involves "terrorism" means that, as a matter of law, that activity will be criminal under the provisions of the 2000 and 2006 Acts, long before, and indeed quite irrespective of whether, any question of prosecution arises. (para 37)
The judgment in the appeal (para 5) recounts how, in the trial the jury asked
"Re: definition of terrorism in [section 1 of the 2000 Act], would the use of force by Coalition forces be classed as terrorism?"In relation to that question, the judge gave the following direction:
"... the use of force by Coalition forces is not terrorism. They do enjoy combat immunity, they are ordered there by our government and the American government, unless they commit crimes such as torture or war crimes ...".I have to say that I am not at all surprised that there should be some such legal principle giving such forces "combat immunity". But I would be very surprised indeed if there were legislation somewhere (of which I've not seen any hint) which amends the definition of "terrorism" in the 2000 Act to exclude action by "Coalition forces". In fact, the Independent Reviewer mentioned the "potential application of the Terrorism Acts even to UK forces engaged in conflicts overseas" (para 61).
The case R v F [2007] EWCA Crim 243, in the Court of Appeal, also primarily about the meaning of "terrorism" in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, makes some similar points at paras 11,27,32.
11. ... "counter-terrorism measures were capable of application to speech or actions concerning resistance to an oppressive regime overseas ..."
27. ... Finally, the legislation does not ... exculpate what some would describe as terrorism in a just cause.
32. ... the terrorist legislation applies to countries which are governed by tyrants and dictators. There is no exemption from criminal liability for terrorist activities which are motivated or said to be morally justified by the alleged nobility of the terrorist cause.
As mentioned above, the consent of the DPP is required for a prosecution, this being seen as "ensuring that a prosecution should not be instigated nor proceed if this would not be in the public interest", and I've noted above what the Court said about that in R v Gul.
There is an additional problem with this line of thinking. It accepts that there are some circumstances where there should not be a prosecution, even when a literal application of the Acts to the facts of a case makes a defendant guilty. But the jury, not the DPP, decides what facts have been proved against a defendant, and no one other than the jury will ever know what facts have been proved. So, if the surrounding circumstances, for example
But there have been instances recently of judges refusing to allow defendants to give evidence or argue about aspects of a case which don't strictly affect guilt or not under the legislation as written - so then the jury wouldn't be in a position to take these other aspects into account.
I will discuss this more in a page on Trudi Warner.